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Abstract
In this paper, we quantify the impact of globalization (i.e., integration of global
capital markets) on intergenerational transfers mediated through Pay As You Go
(PAYG) public pension systems in more developed countries (MDCs), as well as
impacts on the intergenerational distribution of income and wealth.  Our basic finding is
that, while globalization is likely to erode the pension income of older persons, it will
enhance their wealth, leaving their overall spending power little changed.  The working
age population, which earns lower wages, is an unambiguous loser from the
globalization process, at least to the extent that we limit ourselves to a neoclassical
analysis of the phenomenon.
The main impact of globalization is unlikely, however, to be captured by
economy-wide averages such as those presented in this paper.  This is the redistribution
from lifetime non-savers, especially the poor, who depend on labor income while young
and wage-based intergenerational transfers when old, to lifetime savers, who are able to
take advantage of improved capital returns.
While we concentrate on MDCs in this paper, we make the point that economic
impacts of globalization in less developed countries (LDCs) are opposite in sign and
greater in relative magnitude.  The latter is the case because reallocation of capital gives
rise to a greater proportional change in the capital-output ratio in LDCs than in MDCs.
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1. Globalization
Globalization has many dimensions, but we concern ourselves here with the
increasing integration of global capital markets, and specifically, large financial flows
from more developed countries (MDCs) to less developed countries (LDCS).  This is
driven by a number of fundamental factors, among them the nature of technical change,
macroeconomic convergence, and the emergence of advanced information-technology
intensive methods of financial and corporate management.  A number of economic
models also predict that capital should flow from rapidly aging countries to slowly
aging countries, where faster labor force growth and the lower capital-output ratio
should enable it to earn a higher rate of return (MacKellar and Reisen 1998a and b). 1
The distributional impacts of globalization are much discussed, but the
generational dimension seems to have escaped attention.  In this paper, we employ a
two-region, two-factor neoclassical economic-demographic growth model to highlight
the simpler aspects of this dimension, concentrating on intergenerational transfers.
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 In a closed economy, the neoclassical response to slowing labor force growth is to substitute capital for
labor, leading to an increase in the capital-output ratio and a corresponding reduction in the rate of return
to capital. Pari passu, the rate of return to saving declines, leading households to consume rather than
save, so the economy’s reduced demand for investment expenditure is matched by a reduced supply of
savings. In long-run equilibrium, the result of population aging (independent of changes in the rate of
growth of total population) is reduced per capita output and consumption.  In an open economy, the
situation is complicated, because households have the option of purchasing assets installed abroad, where
the rate of return to capital may be higher. A number of studies (Cutler et al., 1990; Masson and Tryon,
1990; Yoo, 1994; Börsch-Supan, 1996; Higgins, 1997; OECD 1998) have concluded that global
demographic divergences should stimulate capital flows from the most rapidly aging regions (especially
Europe and Japan) to less rapidly aging regions (especially North America and the less developed
countries), where the capital-output ratio is lower and the rate of return to capital is higher. With a
significant proportion of MDC savings being invested in emerging markets, capital returns and saving
rates, as well as per capita output and consumption, would be higher in the OECD vis à vis the autarchy
case.  However, simulations with the OECD Minilink model led the authors to caution that any benefits
from investment abroad are likely to be small (OECD, 1998, p. 28).  MacKellar and Reisen (1998a and b)
came to the same conclusion.
22. Globalization, social security, and intergenerational
transfers: theory
Globalization may have three types of effect on intergenerational transfers:
• Globalization may have an impact on formal social security transfer
programs.  An example of such a impact is the reduction in public Pay As
You Go (PAYG) pension system transfers from workers to pensioners which
would occur if such programs were cut as a result of the international
competitive pressures associated with globalization.
• Globalization may have an impact on informal transfers, such as cash- or in-
kind intrafamily transfers (i.e., current transfers) and bequests / inheritance
(i.e., intergenerational capital transfers).  For example, if globalization leads
to reductions in formal transfers from young to old as described above, there
might be a compensating increase in informal transfers from young to old.
Alternatively, if public pension benefits are reduced, old persons might
consume a greater portion of their wealth, resulting in a decline in bequests.
• Globalization may also effect implicit transfers of income and assets
between young and old (i.e., shift the distribution of income and wealth).  An
example of such an implicit impact would be the transfer from workers to
pensioners that would result if globalization drove down wages while
welfare-state transfers to the elderly were maintained.
In this paper, we consider all three types of impacts.  However, the first two sets
of impacts are likely to be heavily conditioned by what is happening to the age-
distribution of income and wealth.  Ignoring dynamic efficiency gains in order to
concentrate on the simple neoclassical analysis of the problem, the impact of increased
capital mobility on the intergenerational distribution of income and wealth is
theoretically ambiguous. In OECD countries, elderly persons’ income depends on past
earnings, which determine savings, the rate of return earned by these savings (both as
they are accumulated and when they are annuitized), and inter vivos transfers mediated
for the most part through public PAYG pension systems. Greater investment of MDC
savings in the emerging markets of less developed countries (LDCs), the main aspect of
globalization, should reduce the capital-labor ratio in the MDCs, thus reducing the
wages of MDC workers
The lower wage bill in the MDCs will reduce PAYG pension system receipts.
The impact on workers and pensioners will depend on policy makers' choice between
higher payroll taxes, higher fiscal deficits, and lower pension benefits.  Prima facie, the
competitive pressures associated with globalization argue in favor of the third, implying
an enhanced role for private saving.
Possible impacts on other cash and in-kind transfers between parents and
children are much more speculative.  Some of these impacts depend on the extent to
which public expenditures substitute for private ones.  For example, if there is
considerable crowding-out, public pension (and health-care system) transfers would
largely be replaced by intrafamily ones, both cash and in-kind, with little resulting
impact on total intergenerational transfers.  Other possible impacts are dependent on the
3labor market.  For example, globalization combined with rigid labor markets might
lengthen the period of youth dependency by increasing the youth unemployment rate
and encouraging delayed labor force entry.2
Lower wages will tend to reduce MDC workers’ savings. However, those
savings that are invested domestically will earn a higher rate of return and those savings
that are invested in the LDCs will reap a premium to the extent that an interregional gap
persists in the risk-adjusted rate of return.  Because savings and the rate of return move
in opposite directions as a result of globalization, the net impact on asset accumulation
is theoretically ambiguous.  Even more uncertain is the impact on the intergenerational
transfer of wealth via bequests.  Greater asset accumulation might translate into higher
consumption in old age or higher bequests.
A similar story in reverse should apply in more slowly aging LDCs, the main
difference being that intrafamily transfers play a larger role than the public pension and
health systems, whose coverage is limited to elites in most countries (World Bank 1994,
James 1998).  Higher wages made possible by the increased capital-output ratio will
permit greater saving, but lower rates of return to capital will retard accumulation (as
well as reduce savings out of entrepreneurial income, a major source of capital in
developing countries).  Higher elderly labor force participation rates in developing
countries should also accentuate the importance of wage income for the elderly
population.
3. The IIASA model: general description3
The IIASA model (MacKellar and Ermolieva 1999, Westlund et al. 1999), based
on work originally presented by Blanchet and Kessler (1992), is a neoclassical two-
factor multiregional economic-demographic model with a particular focus on social
security.4   Its structure may be viewed on the World Wide Web at
http//:www.iiasa.ac.at/~ermol. The model incorporates population projections, saving,
labor force participation, and tax rates.  Output in each region is represented as a
function of capital and labor using a Cobb-Douglas production function.  The wage rate
and rate of return to capital are endogenously calculated as marginal products of labor
and capital.  Age-specific wages, calculated using a model earnings profile, are scaled
up and down as a function of changes in the average wage rate.
The emphasis of the model is on tracking income and outlay of households by
single-year age groups, as well as intergenerational transfers of resources via bequests.
Households accumulate assets during working years and then "dissave" in retirement
(i.e., sell assets to those in the accumulation phase and convert the proceeds into
consumption), in addition to which, intergenerational transfers between the working and
retired populations are mediated through the PAYG public pension system.   While the
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 In this case, the implicit and explicit impacts might be in opposite direction.  A lengthened period of
youth dependency would increase explicit transfers to young persons, while weak labor market conditions
for young persons would represent an implicit transfer from the young to the old.
3
 This section is based on MacKellar and Reisen (1998a and b).
4
 The application presented here is a two-region application, but the model is modularized and coded in
such a way that disaggregation to cover more regions is not problem.  The limitations of a two-region
approach are not insignificant -- an old saying among modelers is that a 3-region world is closer to an n-
region world than a 2-region world is to a 3-region one.
4model is suited to a wide range of applications dealing with long-run economic growth,
it is especially designed to simulate the effects of differing demographic and labor force
scenarios, different mixes between accumulation-based and transfer-based pension
systems, and different decisions regarding the geographic allocation of investment.
The IIASA model is essentially an accounting model based on the OECD
National Accounts, which are based, in turn on the UN System of National Accounts
(SNA).  Age-specific saving and labor force participation rates are exogenous.  In
concentrating on age-composition effects while leaving aside changes in saving
behavior, our work complements other analyses (e.g., Cutler et al., 1990; Börsch-Supan,
1996), where the impact of population aging is mediated through the life-cycle
hypothesis of household consumption.  Closely related to these analyses are linked
international macroeconomic model-based analyses (e.g., Masson and Tryon, 1990;
OECD, 1998), in which the impact of aging is mediated through the major
macroeconomic functions, particularly the aggregate consumption/saving function.
Given theoretical ambiguities, a simple accounting model with abundant demographic
detail provides a useful benchmark for work with more economically sophisticated, but
demographically sparse, models.5
Savings are allocated to investment projects at home and abroad by means of
exogenous capital-flow coefficients, and investment in each region is equal to domestic
plus foreign savings. A rise in foreign savings is assumed to be mirrored by a
corresponding rise in domestic capital formation: the possibility that additional foreign
savings might merely inflate asset prices or fuel consumption is not allowed for and the
current account is assumed to adjust passively to changes in capital inflows.6  The
exchange rate plays no explicit role, and all economic variables are expressed in 1995
US dollars.
The model tracks receipts and disbursements, and thus net savings, by
institutional sector (persons by single-year age group, firms, and government). Net
savings in each sector of the economy are defined, following the convention of the
OECD national income accounts, as gross receipts minus depreciation minus current
expenditure. The sum of net savings across sectors is equal to net saving for the
economy as a whole (national disposable income minus private consumption minus
government consumption), which is in turn equal to net capital formation, i.e. change in
the capital stock.  Savings of firms and government are imputed to households based on
the population age distribution; thus, when government runs a deficit, the impact is
lower capital formation.7 Capital consists of residential capital (KRes), capital operated
by private unincorporated enterprises (KPvtUnincorpEnt), and capital operated by firms
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 It is worth summarizing the impact of age structure on per capita income for a given population size.
This consists of three impacts: first, through the labor force as it affects the number of workers relative to
non-workers; second, through capital formation, as it affects the number of savers relative to dissavers;
and third (also through capital formation) as it affects the wage rate and rate of return to capital, which in
turn determine the income streams out of which savings are drawn.
6
 However, to the extent that foreign capital inflows depress the rate of return to capital and thus the rate
of profit on existing capital, the model incorporates a second-round offset in the form of lower domestic
savings out of profits. This is in line with empirical evidence suggesting that only about one-half of a
given increment to foreign savings is translated into added investment.
7
 Another way of putting it is that there is no explicit market in government debt.  There is only one asset
class, physical capital, which may be installed at home or abroad.
5(i.e., corporate enterprises).  Publicly-owned capital, such as infrastructure, is implicitly
included in the latter category. Residential capital and capital operated by private
unincorporated enterprises are installed exclusively in the home region; capital operated
by firms is installed both at home and abroad.  Claims on capital operated by firms are
held on behalf of households by two financial intermediaries: the private pension system
(PvtPenSys) and other financial institutions (OthFinIns).  All claims consist of equity.
Imputed rents (in the case of residential capital) and the profits of capital operated by
private unincorporated enterprises accrue directly to households. Firms earn profits, pay
taxes and distribute dividends to holders of claims.  Direct taxation follows the principle
of taxation at the source, meaning that capital returns are taxed only once, when and
where they are earned.8
The PvtPenSys represents fully-funded, defined-contribution pension plans; the
model does not specify a private PAYG, defined-benefit component. The rationale for
not including a private PAYG component is twofold. First, the role of private PAYG
pension funds is shrinking rapidly, as few new workers are being offered such
arrangements. Second, the obligations of this component of the pension system are
essentially underwritten by public authorities (e.g., the Pension Benefits Guarantee
Corporation in the US), as a result of which, the distinction between the private and
public PAYG systems is blurred. Implicitly, the private PAYG pension system is
subsumed under the public PAYG pension system in our model.
OthFinIns are a residual sector in our model, covering banks, insurance
companies, mutual funds, and other financial intermediaries apart from pension funds.
Implicitly, OthFinIns also include individual households, to the extent that the latter
hold financial claims directly.
The distinction between portfolio investment and foreign direct investment
(FDI) is a significant one in long-run model simulations.9  Investors who purchase
shares of a domestic-based multinational firm are effectively acquiring an international
asset to the extent that the firm operates globally. FDI, consisting mainly of the
acquisition of fully-owned foreign subsidiaries by multinational firms, is one of the
principal corporate globalization strategies.  Thus, in the IIASA model, we recognize
that firms earn profits both at home and abroad.  In the two-region case, domestic firms
are credited with profits earned on that portion of the domestic region’s capital stock
that is owned by foreign portfolio investors, and are debited with taxes and dividends
paid out of these profits (to the government of the domestic region in the first case, to
the PvtPenSys and OthFinIns of the foreign region, in the second case). However,
profits on that portion of the domestic region’s capital stock that represent FDI from
abroad are credited to foreign firms. Taxes paid out of these profits are debited to firms
in the foreign region and credited to the government of the domestic region.  Firms in
the foreign region reinvest a given share of these profits in the domestic region; the
remainder they repatriate to the foreign region, where dividends are paid out to
claimants.
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 Thus, households pay no taxes on dividends received, taxes have already been paid by firms when
profits were earned. Elderly persons are also assumed to pay no capital gains tax when they divest
themselves of accumulated assets.
9
 FDI is defined as the acquisition of 20% or more of the outstanding equity in a foreign corporation.
Acquisition of less than 20% of the outstanding equity of a foreign firm is defined as portfolio
investment.
6Who are these claimants?  Historically, PvtPenSys portfolio managers have
engaged almost exclusively in portfolio investment.  Almost all FDI has originated in
firms, largely in the form of the acquisition of fully owned foreign subsidiaries. Since
firms in our model only operate, but do not own, capital, we make the simplifying
assumption that FDI is undertaken by corporate holding companies who are implicitly
subsumed under OthFinIns, and the share of OthFinIns foreign assets consisting of FDI
is an exogenous variable.  Dividends paid out of repatriated profits on FDI from abroad
are credited to OthFinIns in the foreign region.  Symmetrically, profits on FDI from the
domestic region in the foreign region are credited to firms in the domestic region, and
dividends paid out of repatriated earnings are credited to OthFinIns in the domestic
region.
The IIASA model tracks the downward pressure on household saving and
capital accumulation that is expected as the baby boomers begin to retire (Schieber and
Shoven, 1994). During working life, households accumulate savings through
contributions to the PvtPenSys; after retirement, they receive pension benefits
representing the drawing-down of this capital.  Savings not captured by the pension
system are distributed between the three remaining asset classes (KRes,
KPvtUnincorpEnt and KOthFinIns) by means of share coefficients which sum to unity.
These assets, too, are drawn down after retirement.  Any assets remaining upon death
are distributed to the surviving population as bequests.  Persons receiving bequests in
the form of inheritance are assumed to convert the inherited assets to cash, some of
which is allocated to consumption, the remainder being allocated among the three non-
pension forms of wealth.   We describe the age-dynamics of capital accumulation in
Annex 1.
Public pension income per capita for the population aged 60+ is scaled to the
current wage rate at age 40.10  The social security contribution rate required to meet total
pension entitlements is then calculated and levied against wage income and income
from private unincorporated enterprises.  Pressures on the social security system are
thus reflected in rising payroll tax rates. The other two possibilities, i.e. declining levels
of benefit per member of the eligible population or higher government budget deficits,
can be incorporated by means of minor modifications of model structure.
4. Simulation design
Model parameterization and scenario assumptions are presented in Annex 2.
The simulation period is effectively from 1995 to 2050; however, we solved the model
out to 2100.  Most of the discussion will concentrate on the OECD.
 The key to the simulation is changes in exogenous capital flow (i.e., investment
allocation) coefficients, more specifically, changes in assumptions on the share of MDC
annual asset acquisition that consists of capital installed in LDCs.   The baseline
scenario, which we label Autarchy, essentially holds current capital-flow share
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 A full specification, not incorporated in this simulation, is as follows (MacKellar and Ermolieva 1999).
Upon retirement, a public pension entitlement is calculated on the basis of past years of labor force
participation and average wage earnings. During retirement, this entitlement is indexed to growth in
average real wages using an assumed indexation factor.  Thus, social security benefits for members of a
given single-year age cohort are a weighted average over number of retirees, number of years of labor
force participation (and average earnings) prior to retirement, number of years elapsed since retirement,
the indexation factor, and growth in real wages since retirement.
7coefficients constant.  The alternative scenario, which we label Globalization, allows
capital-flow share coefficients to rise in line with the growing share of LDCs in global
stock market capitalization and GDP.  The resulting global allocation of capital, which
results from the combination of exogenous flow assumptions and the endogenous
behavior of GDP growth rates, rates of return, etc., is shown in Table 1.
In simulating something as complicated as globalization, even having limited the
analysis to impacts of changes in the global allocation of capital, many aspects must be
held constant.  In this analysis, there are no changes (on a baseline versus alternative
basis) in labor force participation rates, saving / consumption rates, rates of productivity
growth, and tax rates.  As a result of such simplifications, it is probably safe to assume
that the simulation results overstate impacts on the real economy. Government is
assumed to target a constant pension replacement rate (pension income per capita over
60 relative to average wage) of 40 percent.  While restrictive, this assumption is fairly
reasonable in terms of political economy.
5. Results
The broad macroeconomic results, shown in Table 2, are consistent with the
story which has been told by, among others, the OECD Economics Department (OECD
1998).  Globalization reduces MDC GDP as a result of less capital installed at home
while raising GNP slightly in the long run as a result of higher factor earnings from
abroad.  GDP in the LDCs is increased by the greater abundance of capital, as is GNP,
the argument for the latter being that the increment to domestic factor incomes is greater
than the increment to foreign (i.e., MDC) factor incomes.   World GDP (not shown in
Table 2) is increased in line with the global efficiency gain that results from reallocating
capital to the region where its marginal product is highest.  Globalization slightly raises
the rate of return to capital in the MDCs, while substantially reducing it in the LDCs;
this is due to the fact that capital is initially abundant in the first region and scarce in the
second.  The average wage, taken here simply as the age-specific wage at age 40,
declines significantly in the MDCs and increases even more significantly (because of
the greater relative impact on the capital-output ratio) in the LDCs..
The impacts of the globalization scenario on MDC saving rates are not strong
enough to be suggestive (see Table 3).  In the case of household saving rates, changes
(on a baseline versus alternative basis) reflect changes in income and wealth, but not
possible changes in age-specific saving rates. One might expect corporate savings to be
a bit higher under the Globalization scenario than in the Autarchy scenario as a result of
savings out of earnings on foreign direct investment, but this is not visible in Table 3.
Government savings are subject to mixed influences.  Indirect tax revenues are reduced
by lower GDP, direct taxes out of wages are lower, and direct taxes out of profits are
higher.  On whole, the tax base (corresponding to GNP) is higher. The public PAYG
social security system is by definition balanced in this simulation.  The changes in
public savings we see here certainly are not strong enough to support a view that
globalization effects a large implicit intergenerational transfer mediated through the
public sector deficit.
Tables 4 and 5 show impacts on the disposable incomes per capita of the 15-59
and 60+ populations, respectively.  Globalization reduces wage earnings in the MDCs
(on a baseline versus alternative basis) while increasing earnings related to capital; i.e.,
profits of private unincorporated enterprises and imputed housing services as well as
8dividends accruing to KPvtPenSys and KOthFinIns.  Since disposable income of the
working age-population consists primarily of wages, the net effect is to reduce
disposable income of the working-age population in the MDCs (and increase it, more
substantially, in the LDCs).  The total effect, while significant, is modest, roughly 2 per
cent in the MDCs by the year 2030-50.  In the case of adjusted disposable income,
which includes changes in pension wealth, the impact is slightly attenuated by the fact
that pension wealth is higher under the Globalization scenario.
In the MDCs, the largest component of the disposable income of persons over 60
(Table 5) is public pension benefits.  Subject to our simplifying assumption of a fixed
replacement ratio, the public pension income of the elderly would be lower in the
alternative than in the baseline scenario by about 0.7 per cent in 2010, 2.6 percent in
2030 and 4.2 per cent in 2050.  Looked at differently, the implied absolute reduction in
annual public pension income is $71 in 2010, $394 in 2030 and $896 in 2050.  The
impacts on the social security contribution rate required to maintain system balance are
not significant, but this again reflects our simplifying assumption: pensions and wages
go down in lockstep, so the contribution rate necessary to maintain system balance is
unaffected.
Impacts on income of the elderly in LDCs, like impacts on GNP and other
macroeconomic variables, are greater than in the MDCs.  Higher wages will benefit
those elderly who continue to work and encourage intrafamily transfers from children to
non-working parents (the latter effect is not incorporated in this simulation).  The
picture is complicated, however, by the possibility of a number of structural changes:
declines in elderly labor force participation, changes in household living arrangements,
development of social security and pension arrangements, changes in home-care of the
elderly, etc.
When impacts of globalization on wage income, pension income, and returns to
capital are taken together, disposable income of the elderly in the MDCs is very slightly
reduced vis à vis the baseline, according to the results in Table 5.  But resources
available to the elderly for consumption consist in significant part of the proceeds of
asset sales. While wages during the working life are reduced, resulting in lower
pensions, the rate of return on capital is enhanced, resulting in greater accumulation of
assets.
Table 6 shows "dissaving" (i.e., proceeds from the transfer of accumulated
capital via asset sales), which in the alternative scenario is increased (relative to the
baseline scenario) by 0.25 per cent in 2010, 1.7 percent in 2030, and 3.8 per cent in
2050.11  In absolute difference terms, the corresponding figures are $19 in 2010, $175 in
2030 and  $549 in 2050.
When changes in wealth are balanced against changes in public pensions,
reallocation of capital in this simulation does not very significantly affect the average
income of the elderly in the MDCs.  They receive lower intergenerational transfer
payments mediated through the PAYG social system, but earn an enhanced rate of
return on their assets.  Higher assets in old age could potentially translate into greater
intergenerational transfer of wealth through bequests; in our simulation, however, the
elderly are assumed simply to convert their higher net worth into consumption.
                                                
11
 The term "dissaving" is not quite correct, because only 90% of the proceeds of asset sales are assumed
to be converted into consumption, with the remainder being reallocated into other asset classes.
9To encapsulate the results above, comparing the alternative Globalization
scenario with the baseline Autarchy scenario, and concentrating on the year 2030,
• MDC GDP is reduced 2.5 percent while GNP is increased by 0.25 percent..
• The rate of return to capital in the MDCs is 40 basis points higher.
• Saving rate impacts are marginal and ambiguous.
• Assuming the replacement rate in the public pension system is the same in
the two scenarios, public pension income of the elderly is reduced by $400,
or a little more than 2.5 percent.
• The adjusted disposable income per capita of the population aged 15-59 is
1.7 percent lower, and that of the elderly population is 0.6 percent lower
(because wages, which comprise the bulk of the former, are more strongly
affected than pensions, which comprise the bulk of the latter).
• Countervailing downward pressure on public pensions in the MDCs will be
greater accumulation of assets which can be converted into consumption in
old age. When "dissaving" of assets is added to disposable income, te total
resources available for financing consumption of the population aged over
60 is virtually the same in the two scenarios.
• Each of the impacts above occurs in reverse in LDCs.  In every case, the
impact is stronger because the change in the capital-output ratio caused by
globalization is greater.
In closing, we wish to make an important qualification to these results.
Averages, such as these, can be misleading.   In the MDCs, public pensions and
intrafamily transfers comprise virtually the only source of income for the poor, and
those who benefit from the enhanced rate of return to assets are under current
institutional arrangements the well to do.  Globalization rewards lifetime savers in the
MDCs while punishing lifetime non-savers whose resources for consumption in old-age
income depend are derived from wage-income based transfers.
6. Concluding comments
The results presented here suggest that the consequences of globalization for
social security and intergenerational transfers in the MDCs are significant, but modest
on average.  However, the poor and near poor, who depend on labor income while
working and public pensions when retired, will feel the most negative consequences.
The well to do, who derive income from capital and can benefit from modern
techniques of portfolio allocation, will reap the greatest benefits.   Further research
should quantify impacts by social group.  While we have concentrated on the MDCs
countries, our results suggest that impacts of globalization in LDCs are likely to be
relatively greater.
10
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Tables
TABLE 1: Global Capital Flows
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Net capital flows, MDCs to LDCs (bill. 1995 $)
Private pension system
Autarchy 16.08 238.23 230.35 233.65 215.98 171.97 -342.10
Globalization 16.08 568.57 841.70 1108.18 1310.38 1386.40 471.22
Difference (per cent) 0.00 138.67 265.40 374.29 506.71 706.20 -237.74
Other Institutions
Autarchy 114.46 180.12 330.52 353.27 373.22 375.89 108.28
Globalization 114.46 445.07 670.12 900.46 1154.56 1352.91 1618.48
Difference (per cent) 0.00 147.10 102.75 154.89 209.35 259.93 1394.73
Total
Autarchy 130.54 418.35 560.87 586.92 589.20 547.85 -233.82
Globalization 130.54 1013.64 1511.82 2008.64 2464.94 2739.31 2089.70
Difference (per cent) 0.00 142.30 169.55 242.23 318.35 400.01 -993.72
Net capital flows, MDCs to LDCs (per cent of MDC GDP)
Private pension system
Autarchy 0.05 0.53 0.43 0.38 0.31 0.22 -0.26
Globalization 0.05 1.27 1.61 1.87 1.98 1.89 0.37
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.74 1.17 1.49 1.66 1.67 0.63
Other Institutions
Autarchy 0.36 0.40 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.49 0.08
Globalization 0.36 0.99 1.28 1.52 1.74 1.85 1.28
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.59 0.66 0.94 1.20 1.35 1.19
Total
Autarchy 0.40 0.93 1.05 0.96 0.86 0.72 -0.18
Globalization 0.40 2.26 2.89 3.39 3.72 3.74 1.65
Difference 0.00 1.34 1.83 2.42 2.86 3.02 1.82
Net foreign assets: (per cent of GDP)
MDCs
Autarchy 2.73 11.70 18.08 23.15 25.72 25.91 9.75
Globalization 2.73 19.21 38.27 58.10 75.84 89.35 80.97
Difference 0.00 7.51 20.19 34.95 50.11 63.44 71.21
LDCs
Autarchy -13.21 -41.67 -48.52 -46.87 -39.83 -31.12 -5.09
Globalization -13.21 -65.71 -95.06 -106.38 -104.83 -95.43 -39.54
Difference 0.00 -24.04 -46.54 -59.51 -64.99 -64.31 -34.45
cont’d
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TABLE 1(cont’d): Global Capital Flows
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Foreign portfolio share (foreign assets as per cent of total assets)
MDCs
Private pension system
Autarchy 0.89 6.60 8.60 9.67 10.32 10.70 11.00
Globalization 0.89 11.36 18.80 25.60 32.38 39.08 60.17
Difference 0.00 4.76 10.20 15.93 22.07 28.38 49.17
Other Institutions
Autarchy 3.49 8.22 11.32 14.25 16.11 17.26 18.41
Globalization 3.49 12.04 19.72 27.23 34.25 41.27 66.99
Difference 0.00 3.82 8.40 12.98 18.14 24.01 48.59
LDCs
Private pension system
Autarchy 0.32 3.12 6.36 8.04 8.81 9.13 9.25
Globalization 0.32 3.52 6.73 10.54 14.78 19.30 35.86
Difference 0.00 0.40 0.37 2.49 5.97 10.17 26.61
Other Institutions
Autarchy 3.43 6.59 9.02 10.16 10.58 10.69 10.72
Globalization 3.43 6.59 9.15 10.54 11.17 11.38 11.20
Difference 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.39 0.60 0.69 0.49
Share in global market capitalization
MDCs
Autarchy 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.47
Globalization 0.86 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.37
Difference 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 -0.10
LDCs
Autarchy 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.53
Globalization 0.14 0.23 0.30 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.63
Difference 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.10
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TABLE 2: Macroeconomic Aggregates
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
GDP (1995 $ per capita)
MDCs
Autarchy 26292.11 35035.07 40603.80 46027.25 52110.49 59222.92 109963.26
Globalization 26292.11 34795.16 39936.86 44824.42 50280.47 56735.58 106318.96
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.68 -1.64 -2.61 -3.51 -4.20 -3.31
LDCs
Autarchy 1569.14 2329.55 3166.30 4268.46 5746.84 7668.24 27943.83
Globalization 1569.14 2408.81 3364.81 4595.85 6211.40 8262.16 28864.99
Difference (per cent) 0.00 3.40 6.27 7.67 8.08 7.75 3.30
GNP (1995 $ per capita)
MDCs
Autarchy 26375.18 35497.90 41433.16 47251.94 53702.24 61132.33 112373.74
Globalization 26375.18 35500.17 41459.93 47375.89 54065.84 61953.32 119086.27
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.26 0.68 1.34 5.97
LDCs
Autarchy 1545.09 2219.96 2992.73 4038.56 5475.03 7371.24 27624.26
Globalization 1545.09 2241.88 3046.06 4116.88 5565.01 7450.58 27172.36
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.99 1.78 1.94 1.64 1.08 -1.64
Capital-output ratio
MDCs
Autarchy 3.22 3.47 3.77 4.00 4.15 4.23 4.21
Globalization 3.22 3.42 3.65 3.79 3.86 3.88 3.94
Difference 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29 -0.65 -0.27
LDCs
Autarchy 2.56 2.37 2.41 2.44 2.43 2.41 2.44
Globalization 2.56 2.54 2.73 2.83 2.85 2.81 2.61
Difference 0.00 0.17 0.32 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.17
Rate of return to capital
MDCs
Autarchy 0.103 0.095 0.087 0.083 0.080 0.078 0.078
Globalization 0.103 0.096 0.090 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084
Difference 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.006
LDCs
Autarchy 0.129 0.139 0.137 0.135 0.136 0.137 0.135
Globalization 0.129 0.130 0.121 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.127
Difference 0.00 -0.009 -0.004 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.008
Average wage
MDCs
Autarchy 36332.22 47113.96 56918.52 67966.67 80294.14 94095.75 180458.21
Globalization 36332.22 46791.33 55983.59 66190.50 77474.37 90143.77 174477.64
Difference 0.00 -0.68 -1.64 -2.61 -3.51 -4.20 -3.31
LDCs
Autarchy 2440.97 3665.43 4967.09 6708.63 9000.34 12057.64 44505.90
Globalization 2440.97 3790.14 5278.50 7223.19 9727.91 12991.53 45973.02
Difference 0.00 3.40 6.27 7.67 8.08 7.75 3.30
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TABLE 3: Savings
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
MDCs
Total savings (per cent of GDP)
Autarchy 9.37 10.84 9.16 7.81 6.50 5.47 5.48
Globalization 9.37 10.90 9.30 8.04 6.84 5.95 6.36
Difference 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.23 0.34 0.48 0.87
Households
Autarchy 8.08 8.66 7.05 5.84 4.64 3.69 3.54
Globalization 8.08 8.70 7.10 5.87 4.67 3.68 3.06
Difference 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.48
Firms
Autarchy 3.12 4.18 4.31 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.46
Globalization 3.12 4.16 4.29 4.34 4.38 4.50 5.56
Difference 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.17 1.11
Government
Autarchy -1.83 -2.00 -2.20 -2.36 -2.48 -2.55 -2.51
Globalization -1.83 -1.95 -2.09 -2.17 -2.21 -2.23 -2.26
Difference 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.25
LDCs
Total savings (per cent of GDP)
Autarchy 4.55 8.40 8.72 8.62 8.44 8.23 7.22
Globalization 4.55 7.86 7.78 7.50 7.31 7.20 6.71
Difference 0.00 -0.54 -0.94 -1.12 -1.13 -1.03 -0.51
Households
Autarchy 2.28 3.95 3.81 3.56 3.32 3.09 2.26
Globalization 2.28 3.60 3.37 3.14 2.92 2.72 2.07
Difference 0.00 -0.35 -0.43 -0.42 -0.40 -0.37 -0.19
Firms
Autarchy 2.39 4.43 4.93 5.09 5.14 5.15 4.99
Globalization 2.39 4.36 4.65 4.68 4.73 4.79 4.80
Difference 0.00 -0.06 -0.27 -0.41 -0.42 -0.37 -0.19
Government
Autarchy -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
Globalization -0.12 -0.10 -0.25 -0.32 -0.33 -0.31 -0.16
Difference 0.00 -0.13 -0.24 -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.12
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TABLE 4: Disposable Income per capita, Population 15-59
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Wages (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 18291.67 23548.57 27375.72 31076.44 35228.61 40150.41 75686.14
Globalization 18291.67 23389.90 26933.86 30281.40 34021.12 38508.03 73247.55
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.67 -1.61 -2.56 -3.43 -4.09 -3.22
LDCs
Autarchy 1265.88 1798.21 2396.70 3167.07 4187.70 5526.59 19111.52
Globalization 1265.88 1859.05 2546.09 3408.33 4523.56 5950.65 19730.09
Difference (per cent) 0.00 3.38 6.23 7.62 8.02 7.67 3.24
Imputed housing services (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 1017.63 997.23 1050.47 1109.09 1154.31 1241.99 2205.36
Globalization 1017.63 1025.57 1131.11 1260.42 1386.52 1560.28 2685.73
Difference (per cent) 0.00 2.84 7.68 13.64 20.12 25.63 21.78
LDCs
Autarchy 55.17 56.26 71.17 90.60 115.94 155.75 589.42
Globalization 55.17 49.01 53.85 62.68 77.24 104.39 479.03
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -12.88 -24.34 -30.82 -33.38 -32.98 -18.73
Entrepreneurial Income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 778.38 523.50 474.17 459.81 455.49 476.91 832.64
Globalization 778.38 538.47 510.72 522.83 547.58 599.81 1015.41
Difference (per cent) 0.00 2.86 7.71 13.70 20.22 25.77 21.95
LDCs
Autarchy 47.83 33.27 36.78 44.54 55.74 73.58 260.43
Globalization 47.83 29.00 27.84 30.80 37.11 49.28 211.51
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -12.84 -24.31 -30.84 -33.42 -33.03 -18.78
Dividends, KOthFinIns (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 189.04 207.29 228.37 249.83 267.94 294.08 518.34
Globalization 189.04 208.37 231.83 257.34 288.18 319.74 540.00
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.52 1.51 3.01 7.55 8.73 4.18
LDCs
Autarchy 9.75 11.12 14.27 18.11 23.08 30.93 116.99
Globalization 9.75 9.63 10.64 12.16 14.57 19.06 80.83
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -13.36 -25.42 -32.85 -36.88 -38.36 -30.91
Dividends, KPvtPenSys (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 58.31 276.70 335.96 379.09 423.02 469.02 889.17
Globalization 58.31 283.74 354.39 416.07 489.52 575.79 1274.54
Difference (per cent) 0.00 2.55 5.49 9.75 15.72 22.76 43.34
(cont’d)
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TABLE 4 (cont’d): Disposable Income per capita, Population 15-59
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
LDCs
Autarchy 0.66 16.81 26.46 36.63 50.39 69.66 270.82
Globalization 0.66 14.86 21.29 28.14 38.24 53.18 218.75
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -11.58 -19.53 -23.16 -24.11 -23.66 -19.23
Disposable income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 20276.72 25276.58 29128.73 32895.17 37106.36 42163.38 79242.48
Globalization 20276.72 25162.31 28807.51 32321.99 36243.41 40987.86 77488.68
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.45 -1.10 -1.74 -2.33 -2.79 -2.21
LDCs
Autarchy 1378.65 1898.86 2518.92 3320.33 4382.46 5786.84 20078.36
Globalization 1378.65 1946.69 2638.42 3513.97 4652.48 6123.38 20501.46
Difference (per cent) 0.00 2.52 4.74 5.83 6.16 5.82 2.11
PvtPenSys contributions out of wage income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 2393.87 3384.76 4128.47 4970.40 5868.67 6807.83 12856.54
Globalization 2393.87 3361.59 4060.66 4840.51 5662.58 6521.90 12430.46
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.68 -1.64 -2.61 -3.51 -4.20 -3.31
LDCs
Autarchy 107.76 163.68 225.16 304.73 412.75 558.79 2141.72
Globalization 107.76 169.25 239.28 328.10 446.11 602.07 2212.32
Difference (per cent) 0.00 3.40 6.27 7.67 8.08 7.75 3.30
PvtPenSys contributions out of entreprenerial income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 151.44 97.35 90.01 92.91 95.98 102.07 180.30
Globalization 151.44 100.13 96.93 105.61 115.33 128.26 219.17
Difference (per cent) 0.00 2.86 7.70 13.67 20.15 25.66 21.56
LDCs
Autarchy 5.75 3.81 4.27 5.37 6.83 9.15 35.10
Globalization 5.75 3.32 3.23 3.72 4.55 6.13 28.54
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -12.82 -24.26 -30.80 -33.36 -32.94 -18.68
Adjusted Disposable Income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 22880.34 29035.39 33683.17 38337.58 43494.04 49542.31 93168.48
Globalization 22880.34 28907.77 33319.49 37684.18 42510.83 48213.82 91412.86
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.44 -1.08 -1.70 -2.26 -2.68 -1.88
LDCs
Autarchy 1492.82 2083.16 2774.81 3667.05 4852.43 6424.44 22526.01
Globalization 1492.82 2134.13 2902.23 3873.93 5141.39 6784.76 22961.07
Difference (per cent) 0.00 2.45 4.59 5.64 5.95 5.61 1.93
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TABLE 5: Disposable Income per capita, Population 60+
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Wages (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 4817.71 5839.16 6615.47 6606.72 6764.63 7448.32 12534.12
Globalization 4817.71 5799.74 6508.44 6437.20 6531.96 7142.46 12128.59
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.68 -1.62 -2.57 -3.44 -4.11 -3.24
LDCs
Autarchy 600.02 634.65 850.61 1086.25 1251.94 1595.71 4821.97
Globalization 600.02 656.13 903.65 1169.04 1352.42 1718.26 4978.32
Difference (per cent) 0.00 3.38 6.24 7.62 8.03 7.68 3.24
Imputed housing services (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 1777.19 1640.46 1392.54 1263.94 1279.13 1361.27 2396.12
Globalization 1777.19 1691.97 1515.59 1465.67 1584.71 1781.64 3021.59
Difference (per cent) 0.00 3.14 8.84 15.96 23.89 30.88 26.10
LDCs
Autarchy 220.81 187.94 170.68 190.04 250.08 322.11 1006.60
Globalization 220.81 161.15 123.11 122.81 153.22 197.19 780.82
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -14.25 -27.87 -35.38 -38.73 -38.78 -22.43
Entreprenerial Income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 1804.13 1932.30 1503.19 1210.50 1135.58 1175.71 2078.24
Globalization 1804.13 1993.56 1638.87 1408.50 1412.64 1546.82 2644.24
Difference (per cent) 0.00 3.17 9.03 16.36 24.40 31.56 27.23
LDCs
Autarchy 224.14 235.30 186.57 171.32 208.57 266.39 843.53
Globalization 224.14 201.69 133.94 109.61 126.35 160.68 646.50
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -14.28 -28.21 -36.02 -39.42 -39.68 -23.36
Dividends, KOthFinIns (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 400.89 462.51 435.30 432.55 471.12 529.32 959.11
Globalization 400.89 468.57 448.13 452.58 513.65 584.25 1049.85
Difference (per cent) 0.00 1.31 2.95 4.63 9.03 10.38 9.46
LDCs
Autarchy 47.40 46.20 43.47 49.47 65.54 84.22 265.02
Globalization 47.40 40.27 32.94 33.79 42.17 53.05 184.39
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -12.85 -24.22 -31.70 -35.65 -37.01 -30.42
cont’d
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TABLE 5 (cont’d): Disposable Income per capita, Population 60+
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Dividends, KPvtPenSys (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 123.64 306.53 485.37 590.78 682.81 784.76 1497.80
Globalization 123.64 314.31 512.93 648.13 785.89 953.21 2155.94
Difference (per cent) 0.00 2.54 5.68 9.71 15.10 21.47 43.94
LDCs
Autarchy 3.21 19.23 40.34 62.98 89.12 119.53 405.51
Globalization 3.21 16.83 31.40 46.51 64.80 88.14 324.53
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -12.51 -22.16 -26.16 -27.29 -26.26 -19.97
Social security benefits (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 7912.38 10241.07 12364.09 15076.33 18101.04 21352.97 41785.48
Globalization 7912.38 10170.94 12161.00 14682.34 17465.37 20456.16 40400.67
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.68 -1.64 -2.61 -3.51 -4.20 -3.31
LDCs
Autarchy 480.97 778.55 1046.95 1421.72 1958.23 2632.40 9820.31
Globalization 480.97 805.03 1112.59 1530.77 2116.53 2836.28 10144.03
Difference (per cent) 0.00 3.40 6.27 7.67 8.08 7.75 3.30
Adjusted Disposable Income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 16712.31 20115.50 22310.59 24590.05 27751.51 31867.60 59753.06
Globalization 16712.31 20124.79 22272.04 24446.29 27508.34 31511.33 59244.94
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.05 -0.17 -0.58 -0.88 -1.12 -0.85
LDCs
Autarchy 1573.34 1882.64 2298.28 2918.80 3734.36 4900.84 16757.42
Globalization 1573.34 1864.28 2306.24 2966.02 3790.70 4965.47 16734.07
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.98 0.35 1.62 1.51 1.32 -0.14
Disposable Income (1995 U.S. $)
MDCs
Autarchy 17496.43 21213.12 24388.65 27589.26 31659.02 36669.97 69415.72
Globalization 17496.43 21223.11 24352.87 27449.88 31423.04 36325.49 69112.68
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.05 -0.15 -0.51 -0.75 -0.94 -0.44
LDCs
Autarchy 1592.06 1928.20 2401.95 3092.39 3990.27 5250.64 18018.16
Globalization 1592.06 1909.65 2408.97 3138.06 4044.20 5313.20 17985.99
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.96 0.29 1.48 1.35 1.19 -0.18
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TABLE 6: "Dissaving" in Retirement
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
PvtPenSys assets (1995 U.S. $ per person over 60)
MDCs
Autarchy 784.12 1097.62 2078.06 2999.21 3907.51 4802.37 9662.66
Globalization 784.12 1098.33 2080.82 3003.58 3914.71 4814.16 9867.74
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.25 2.12
LDCs
Autarchy 18.72 45.56 103.67 173.60 255.91 349.81 1260.73
Globalization 18.72 45.37 102.72 172.04 253.51 347.73 1251.92
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.41 -0.91 -0.89 -0.94 -0.59 -0.70
OthFinIns assets (1995 U.S. $ per person over 60)
MDCs
Autarchy 2545.76 1957.60 2287.21 2644.06 3188.31 3836.31 7495.02
Globalization 2545.76 1959.08 2297.14 2675.16 3256.63 3980.38 9168.77
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.08 0.43 1.18 2.14 3.76 22.33
LDCs
Autarchy 277.33 129.31 130.39 153.36 207.46 271.95 921.15
Globalization 277.33 129.60 129.26 148.53 196.92 255.89 888.32
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.22 -0.87 -3.15 -5.08 -5.90 -3.56
Residential assets (1995 U.S. $ per person over 60)
MDCs
Autarchy 3154.00 1992.28 2093.17 2228.30 2538.00 2936.93 5491.89
Globalization 3154.00 1999.29 2121.31 2289.28 2653.39 3124.13 5919.43
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.35 1.34 2.74 4.55 6.37 7.78
LDCs
Autarchy 360.92 152.18 144.71 162.51 215.66 281.32 948.38
Globalization 360.92 148.10 132.46 140.89 179.62 229.52 825.48
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -2.68 -8.47 -13.30 -16.71 -18.41 -12.96
PvtUnincorpEnt assets (1995 U.S. $ per person over 60)
MDCs
Autarchy 3330.32 2543.78 2590.70 2495.12 2602.85 2890.96 5399.09
Globalization 3330.32 2553.33 2630.15 2573.93 2736.01 3096.73 5892.34
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.38 1.52 3.16 5.12 7.12 9.14
LDCs
Autarchy 381.00 209.95 185.09 171.33 203.99 260.55 894.31
Globalization 381.00 204.33 168.61 146.61 167.23 208.62 765.08
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -2.68 -8.91 -14.43 -18.02 -19.93 -14.45
cont’d
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TABLE 6 (cont’d): "Dissaving" in Retirement
1995 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Total (1995 U.S. $ per person over 60)
MDCs
Autarchy 9814.20 7591.28 9049.14 10366.69 12236.67 14466.58 28048.65
Globalization 9814.20 7610.03 9129.43 10541.95 12560.74 15015.40 30848.28
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.25 0.89 1.69 2.65 3.79 9.98
LDCs
Autarchy 1037.97 537.00 563.86 660.79 883.02 1163.62 4024.58
Globalization 1037.97 527.40 533.04 608.07 797.28 1041.77 3730.80
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -1.79 -5.47 -7.98 -9.71 -10.47 -7.30
Disposable Income
MDCs
Autarchy 17496.43 21213.12 24388.65 27589.26 31659.02 36669.97 69415.72
Globalization 17496.43 21223.11 24352.87 27449.88 31423.04 36325.49 69112.68
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.05 -0.15 -0.51 -0.75 -0.94 -0.44
LDCs
Autarchy 1592.06 1928.20 2401.95 3092.39 3990.27 5250.64 18018.16
Globalization 1592.06 1909.65 2408.97 3138.06 4044.20 5313.20 17985.99
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -0.96 0.29 1.48 1.35 1.19 -0.18
Income plus dissaving
MDCs
Autarchy 27310.62 28804.40 33437.79 37955.95 43895.69 51136.55 97464.37
Globalization 27310.62 28833.14 33482.30 37991.82 43983.78 51340.89 99960.96
Difference (per cent) 0.00 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.20 0.40 2.56
LDCs
Autarchy 2630.03 2465.20 2965.81 3753.18 4873.29 6414.27 22042.74
Globalization 2630.03 2437.05 2942.01 3746.14 4841.48 6354.98 21716.80
Difference (per cent) 0.00 -1.14 -0.80 -0.19 -0.65 -0.92 -1.48
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Annex 1: The life-cycle dynamics of capital accumulation
There are four different types of capital: residential capital (KRes), capital
operated by private unincorporated enterprises (KPvtUnincorpEnt), capital operated by
firms and held on households’ behalf by the private pension system (KPvtPenSys), and
capital operated by firms and held on households’ behalf by other financial institutions
(KOthFinIns).   Corresponding to each of the four types of capital is an age-specific
capital accumulation equation which tracks assets as the population ages. The major
structural difference is between KPvtPensSys and the other three asset classes.  Funds
flow into PvtPenSys only through payroll deductions (including deductions from
entrepreneurial income) on behalf of system participants. Dividends earned on assets
held by the PvtPenSys remain within the system until the worker retires.  By contrast,
savings of all origins, not just captive retirement-related savings, flow into KOthFinIns,
KRes, and KPvtUnincorpEnt.  Dividends earned on assets held by OthFinIns may be
allocated to consumption at any point during the life cycle, as may profits accruing to
KPvtUnincorp Ent (implicit rents on KRes are assumed to be consumed in their
entirety).  If saved, dividends earned on assets held by OthFinIns may remain within
OthFinIns, or be allocated to residential investment or investment in capital operated by
PvtUnincorpEnt.
Private Pension System (PvtPenSys)
The private pension system is assumed to be a fully-funded defined contribution
system.  No distinction is made between workers’ and employers’ contributions and the
contribution rates out of wages and entrepreneurial income are assumed to be identical.
Contributions out of wage and entrepreneurial income are
),( ),(),( tageWageYtageontRatePvtPenSysCtageontWageYPvtPenSysC =
,t) EntrY(agetageontRatePvtPenSysCtageontEntrYPvtPenSysC ),(),( =
The age-specific accumulation equation for the private pension wealth is
),()1,1(),( tagesKPvtPensSyagetKPvtPenSystageKPvtPenSys ∆+−−=
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In order, these components of change are:
• current contributions (zero for persons who have retired),
receipt of dividends,
• dissaving via the conversion of retirees’ accumulated assets into consumption, and
finally,
• outflow of funds via death of claimants and ensuing pay-out of their accumulation.
Note that, for an individual cohort born in year t = 0 whose last members die out in year
t = MaxAge, lifetime pension contributions plus lifetime earnings on pension assets plus
lifetime pension benefits received equals bequest of pension wealth; i.e.,
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In accordance with the System of National Accounts, changes in pension fund equity
are added to household savings from all other sources as an adjustment:
),(),(     
),(),(     
),(),(
tageSysBeqKPvtPentageenPvtPenSysB
tageenSysFirmsKPvtPDividErngstageSysContPvtPen
tageNetSvngHHtageHHAdjNetSvng
−−
++
=
where NetSvngHH covers all savings excluding change in pension fund equity.
Other asset classes (KOthFinIns, KRes, KPvtUnincorpEnt)
For * = KRes, KPvtUnincorpEnt, and KOthFinIns, the age-specific
accumulation equations are
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The components of change are, in order:
• Unadjusted household net savings (i.e., not including savings captured by the private
pension system) plus the imputed savings of firms and government.  In imputing
corporate and government savings to households by age group, shares drawn from
the population age distribution are used.  Another share variable, which sums to
unity across the three forms of non-pension wealth, is used to apportion savings
between •KRes, •KPvtUnincorpEnt, and •KOthFinIns.  Note that allocation shares are
not indexed by age.  This simplification frees computer memory for tracking the
results of numerous uncertainty simulations.  Shares may be age-indexed in non-
stochastic model application.
• The second line, of relevance only to retired households, subtracts "dissaving" in the
form of sales of accumulated assets.  The third line, also of relevance only for
retired households, reflects the allocation of the proceeds of asset sales among the
three forms of non-pension wealth.  Consumption from the proceeds of asset sales is
not subtracted because this consumption has already been factored into adjusted
household net saving in the first line.
• The fourth line subtracts bequests, which represent a leakage of wealth out of the
age group.
• The fifth line adds inheritance, an injection of wealth, and subtracts asset sales
which occur in consequence of inheritance.
• The sixth and last line is analogous to the third line, but applies to households
everywhere in the age spectrum and includes the disposition of inherited pension-,
as well as non-pension, wealth.
Accounting consistency check
We now check that total net capital formation is equal to total net savings.  First,
adding across the three non-pension forms of wealth,
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Cancellations bring us to
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Adding pension wealth,
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Based on the definition of adjusted net household savings given above,
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•KPvtPenSys  is cancelled out, leaving the result
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In other words, change in wealth for members of an age group in a given year is
equal to their net saving, including net saving through the private pension system and
their imputed share of the net savings of firms and government, plus the sum across all
asset classes of inheritance minus bequests.
Summing over age groups, inheritance and bequests cancel out, leaving us with
)()()()( ttNetSvngGovtmsNetSvngFirtHHAdjNetSvngtKTot ++=∆
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Annex 2: Parameters and Scenario Assumptions
Parameterization and initialization assumptions are largely ad hoc, but this
should not greatly affect the marginal simulation properties of the model.  That is,
refining the rough assumptions set forth below probably would not affect our baseline
versus alternative scenario conclusions substantively.
Demography and labor markets
Demographic assumptions are taken from the IIASA Central Scenario
population projection (Lutz, 1996).  “MDC" and “LDC" regions correspond to
“industrial” and “developing” countries in the IIASA projection.
Labor force participation rate projections (both sexes combined) were taken
from the International Labour Organisation (1986).  In the MDCs, over the prime labor
force participation years (25-60), the labor force participation rate was approximately 75
percent; over 60, it was approximately 10 percent (staring at 30 percent at age 60,
declining to 5 percent at 75 and zero thereafter).  In the LDCs, the two corresponding
figures were 75 percent and 15 percent, respectively, with the latter gradually declining
to 10 percent over the simulation period.
The production function
The ß (capital) coefficient in the Cobb-Douglas production function was
assumed to be 0.33 in both MDCs and LDCs.  The rate of total factor productivity
growth was assumed to be 1% per year in the MDCs and 2% per year in the LDCs.
Information from various sources led us to initialize the model on 1995 per capita GDP
levels of approximately $25,000 and $1,500 in the MDCs and LDCs, respectively.
Social insurance contribution rates
It was assumed in the MDCs that the rate of saving in private pension plans (out
of both wage and entrepreneurial income) was 5 percent up to age 40 and 15 percent
from age 40 until retirement.  These assumptions were kept constant over the simulation
period.  In LDCs, the corresponding figures were assumed to be 5 percent and 10
percent.  Public pension contribution rates were calculated to ensure PAYG system
balance.
Public pension system benefit calculation
Pension payments per member of the population aged 60+ are set equal to 40
percent of the current-year wage at age 40.
Consumption/saving rates
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In both regions, it was assumed for the population aged 15-59 that the average
propensity to consume out of disposable wage income was 90%.  In the MDCs, the
average propensity to consume out of entrepreneurial income was set equal to 60
percent; in LDCs, the corresponding assumption was 70 percent.  Propensities to
consume are age-invariant.  All imputed rental income was assumed to be consumed.
The elderly are assumed to consume 90% of the proceeds of asset sales.  30% of
inherited wealth was assumed to be converted into consumption, with the remainder
being distributed among KPvtUnincorpEnt, KRes, and KOthFinIns.
Intergenerational capital transfers
In both regions, the population over age 60 was assumed to make annual
unremunerated capital transfers of 3 percent of their residential capital assets and 5
percent of their KPvtUnincorpEnt assets.  These transfers were allocated to the
population aged over 15 according to age-specific population shares.  No explicit
transfers of income (apart from the PAYG pension mechanism) were included in the
model.
Taxes and government consumption
The direct tax rate (relative to wages and profits) was assumed to be 15% in both
the MDCs and LDCs.  The indirect tax rate (relative to GDP) was set at 6% in the
MDCs and 8% in the LDCs.  Government consumption was assumed to be 20% of GDP
in both regions.
Initializing capital stocks and claims
Total initial capital stocks were calculated based on the assumed per capita GDP
levels given above and assumed capital-output ratios of approximately 3.2 in the MDCs
and 2.5 in the LDCs.  The depreciation rate was assumed to be 4% per year in the
MDCs and 6% per year in the LDCs.
In both regions, it was assumed that 1% of all initial claims on capital consisted
of claims on capital installed in the foreign region (i.e., K12 / K1*   = 0.01 and K21 / K2*   =
0.01).  33% of K
*1 and 33% of K*2 were assumed to consist of residential capital;
similarly, 33% of K
*1 and 33% of K*2 were assumed to consist of capital operated by
private unincorporated enterprises.
For the MDCs, total claims of the PvtPenSys were assumed to be approximately
$8,000 billion based on data from InterSec Research Company (MacKellar and Reisen
1998).  Based on World Bank (1997) estimates, $100 billion of this total was assumed
to consist of claims on capital installed in the LDCs.  Letting 1 index the MDCs and 2
index LDCs, this allowed calculation of KPvtPenSys11, KOthFinIns12, and KOthFinIns11
as residuals.  For the LDCs, total claims of PvtPenSys were assumed to be $300 billion
based on the data in Table 1, and the initial-year value of KPvtPenSys21 was assumed to
be zero.
FDI claims were assumed to account for 50% of initial-year KOthFinIns12 and
KOthFinIns21, gradually increasing as discussed in the text.
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Residential investment and investment in private unincorporated enterprises
In both regions, the share of net domestic unadjusted savings (i.e., savings not
counting changes in pension fund equity) allocated to residential investment was
assumed to be 30 percent.  25 percent of remaining unadjusted savings were allocated to
KPvtUnincorpEnt, leaving 75 percent to be invested in KOthFinIns.
Sharing out investment between regions
We estimate that, in 1995, 1% of all purchases of assets by MDC pension fund
managers consisted of claims on capital installed in the LDCs. For OthFinIns, the
corresponding figure was 15%, the higher number being largely due to the role of FDI.
In the baseline scenario, which corresponds roughly to a situation of autarchy,
the foreign-investment share of the PvtPenSys is assumed to rise gradually to 10%
between 1995 and 2005, then to remain constant through 2100.  The foreign-investment
share of OthFinIns is assumed simply to remain constant at 15%. The share of
OthFinIns foreign assets consisting of FDI claims is assumed to remain constant at
50%, and the proportion of FDI earnings reinvested is kept constant at 20%.
In the alternative scenario, designed to illustrate the impacts of financial
globalization, the allocation of MDC investment is shifted to reflect the share of LDCs
in global stock market capitalization (estimated as total capital stocks minus residential
capital stocks minus capital operated by PvtUnincorpEnt) and output. The alternative
scenario can be envisioned as one based on lower estimates of sovereign risk.  There is
simultaneity, which the model captures, between capital-flow coefficients and regional
market shares.
In the case of pension fund managers, the share of annual investment
expenditure allocated to LDCs is set equal to that region´s share in global stock market
capitalization, just under 15% in 1995, rising to almost 40% in 2050, and nearly 60% in
2100.12  In the case of OthFinIns, the foreign investment share was taken as a weighted
average of the emerging markets' shares in global stock market capitalization and in
world GDP, the weights reflecting the portfolio-FDI split in foreign assets held by
OthFinIns.  The FDI share was assumed to rise linearly from 50% in 1995 to 67% in
2100, while the share of FDI earnings reinvested was set equal to emerging market
economies' share in world GDP.  The rationale behind these assumptions is that, in a
totally integrated world market, the rigidities that lead international investors to prefer
portfolio claims to FDI should diminish, as should the disincentives to reinvesting
earnings in the host country.  The impact is to raise the share of MDC OthFinIns assets
located in LDCs to 42% in 2050 (as opposed to an estimated 3.5 percent in 1995 and a
projected 17 percent under conditions of autarchy in the baseline scenario) and 67% in
2100 (compared to a baseline scenario level of 19%).
In the LDCs, aggregate GDP growth is likely to be more rapid than in the
MDCs, per capita income levels are likely to rise substantially, and age-distribution
trends are favorable for savings.  On all three counts, aggregate savings in the emerging
market economies are likely to play a growing role in the world economy, and
                                                
12
 All alternative assumptions are phased in gradually over the first ten years of the simulation period.
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assumptions made regarding the behavior of LDC portfolio managers are an important
aspect of scenario design.
In the Autarchy Scenario, the domestic investment share of LDC pension fund
managers is assumed to decline gradually from 99% in 1995 to 90% in 2005, after
which it remains fixed.  The domestic investment share of OthFinIns is assumed to
remain constant at 85% throughout the simulation period.  These assumptions mirror
those made for the MDCs.
An alternative scenario where MDC portfolio managers diversify while LDC
portfolio managers continue to invest most of their capital domestically would give rise
to a lopsided global picture over the very long term. Under such a scenario, net foreign
assets of the MDCs would grow explosively, as would net factor payments from LDCs
to MDCs, giving rise to unreasonable gaps between gross national product (GNP) and
GDP in both regions.  Moreover, recent experience indicates that when capital controls
are lifted, portfolio managers in emerging economies have been eager to diversify into
more mature financial markets.
Therefore, we assume in the Globalization Scenario that LDC portfolio
managers also begin to diversify internationally, although less aggressively than their
MDC counterparts.  Whereas MDC portfolio managers are assumed to rationalize their
investment allocation decisions instantly, LDC managers are assumed to do so slowly
over the course of the simulation period. The domestic investment share of the
PvtPenSys, after reaching 90% in 2005, is assumed to decline linearly by one-half
percentage point per year until it equals the LDC region´s share in global stock market
capitalization. After this point, the PvtPenSys domestic investment share is assumed to
move in line with the LDC region´s share in global capitalization. Exactly the same
assumption was made regarding the domestic investment share of OthFinIns in the
LDCs, the only difference being that the target share reflected shares in both stock
market capitalization and in world GDP.   The share of FDI in OthFinIns foreign assets
was assumed to rise linearly from 50% to 67% over the simulation period and the share
of FDI earnings reinvested in the MDCs was set equal to the MDCs´ share in world
GDP.  These assumptions are identical to those made in the case of MDC portfolio
management.
Firms in both regions were assumed to pay out 15% of pre-tax profits to holders
of claims, as well as 15% of repatriated earnings on FDI abroad.
